28 thoughts on “PHILOSOPHY – Epistemology: Analyzing Knowledge #3 (Causal and Reliabilist Theories) [HD]”

  1. Doesn't reliabilism fall prey to the original Gettier problem? Surely, the mechanism used to form that original belief was reliable – after all, we wouldn't call it justified if it was unreliable. If we do accept reliabilism, we should also accept causalism. A belief must be caused by its own truth by a reliable method to be knowledge.

  2. Reliabilism just seems to push the problem back a step without resolving it.  Now we have to find a criterion for "reliable belief-forming process" in place of one for knowledge.  We now need to decide how one can know that he knows.   The problem with positions such as Millikan's seems to be that it suggests the whole problem can be changed just by focusing on one thing at a time.  Both the barn example and the lottery drag in probability and seem to simply move toward a Bayesian approach not just as an account of how beliefs are actually formed, but as a criterion for how they should be formed.  I can't feel compelled by any account of "knowledge" which is going to be based on probability or notions of the epistemological status of beliefs about other things, such as the fake barns surrounding the real barn.

  3. I'm sure the content of your videos are good but I can't stand watching a hand write and draw things very slowly

  4. Please use real world examples, and possibly historical examples…. these hypothetical examples do not do a good job of illustrating the usefulness of philosophy….

  5. I'd, perhaps, still say that 'knowing' is relative. What then am I looking for in terms of arguments and their premise? What then am I looking for in terms of truth?

  6. I have a slight problem with the barn facade example. All sensory interpretation operates like a barn facade, that is to say all perceptual objects of knowledge are representation. In fact the true dilemma is finding the "real barn". The only retreat from the barn facade is a naive realism that we have long abandon by a prescientific road. True perception is always part delusion. We speak of delusion as if it were not woven into the fabric of perception.

  7. Great video except all the characters are brown…annnd through Goldmans' theory I know that you're Cucked.

  8. Here's a nihilistic analysis of Goldman's Problem: does it matter? Here's a PoliSci analysis: what is the propaganda value of the Potemkin barn-village? So unless it matters, what is the cost-benefit analysis of holding false beliefs? And, worse: are there social pressures to conform to or affirm false beliefs? Or perhaps, just perhaps, in Fake Barn Country, there are tells which determines whether you are making a Type I or Type II error, of a proper hit or a correct rejection. And I think we're off into Bayesian probabilities, the consequence of which is at what point are the probabilities also looking at the problem of Sorites paradox.

  9. These are fun mental games –> but very misleading. They are instances of the Map v Territory fallacy. Or maybe the "Use/Mention" problem. Things precede words. Words are made up to refer to things. There are many things without words, but no words without things. We must perceive up and down for the words "up" and "down" to have meaning. We can't define them without reference to perceptions. The failure to come up with air-tight definitions for words does not mean that those words fail to refer to things. Knowledge is a word that is used by different people to refer to different constructs –> that doesn't mean that those constructs don't exist. They do. Each construct is a mental model used by brains to organize a pattern of ideas. Our "knowledge" problem is not a "knowledge problem" – its a social problem of disagreement over the use of the word knowledge. And this is the great futility for philosophers–> dissatisfying to them because the game of philosophy is played in language. But that's that.

  10. This whole mess of epistemology seems to be leading to an inevitable conclusion: you can't know anything, unless you know everything. So, short of omniscience, you can only believe a thing.

    Since no one could know everything, no one knows anything. So even if Humankind managed to gather all data about everything, no single human could know that data is true, and anything he proclaims as a result of that data is ultimately proclamations of faith. Frustrating.

  11. I believe Goldman is nitpicking and concentrating on superficial logical aspects and is voluntarily being dense and technical.

    I believe that it has very little to add to the debate.

  12. SOO much mental masturbation! !!
    Not you Professor, your dissertation was awesome and instructive, love your videos 🙂

  13. I would say Henry knows that he is looking at a barn, he just don't know if it's a real barn.

    As well, I would like to raise another question, not directly based on the topic of this video, but also linked to Scepticalism:

    If you close your eyes and hold your hand in front of your face, how can you be sure, until you open your eyes, that your hand is actually there where you believe it is?

    I hope I made my thoughts halfway understandable.

  14. The reality of our universe does not exist in the form of consequent frozen moments. The universe and the continuity of the space-time is one and the same.
    – So, any attempt to create a scenario of fixed conditions is an abstraction.
    – The subject perceives the reality in the form of momentary and continuous reconstructions (or abstractions) of the reality.
    – So, any attempt of devising knowledge is sourced from these continuous reconstructions of the reality.
    – In this process, the subject tests their reconstruction against the perceived “truth” of reality, and produces knowledge. So “Knowledge” in this sense is more of a guessing game.
    – In this sense, it is only possible to confirm knowledge definitely (absolute knowledge) if the confirmer created the universe itself. In other words, in order to confirm the knowledge of the subject, our perception of the subject and the conditions; must not be reconstructions of our own, they must be absolute. They need to be sourced “outside” of the borders of universe.
    – Thus, knowledge (definite and absolute knowledge) is only possible if god exists.
    – Note that existence of reality is not dependent on god, but the knowledge of it is.
    Well, it’s been fun writing this, hope it’s not complete garbage.

  15. Some version of reliabilism is obviously sound. Attempts at over-reduction are inherently problematic. It seems we can not always categorize knowledge gaining process (such as 'appropriate causal connection') as reliable or unreliable, but in degrees, (In that case in degrees of appropriateness). So how do we define something like a 'threshold of reasonable reliability' Well that's the question here to me. Attempting to place exact 'odd's is likewise sometimes problematic. A knowledge of the nature of probability is sometimes relevant of course, but especially because of the way interpretations of probability can so easily mislead us, even when considering the topic here. 'Lottery knowledge' can't be used as a comparison against certain kinds of observational knowledge of course. I view reliabilism as a generic, non-proprietary, self-evident basis for analyzing the knowledge process. I think it may require either slightly different versions for each context, or a some conditional wording etc. But the conditional wording itself might sneak back in. So maybe there is no shortcut to 'custom-made' theorems for essentially different scenarios, but maybe there's a finite set of those, idk. For example the knowledge of a moon landing can get more reliable through additional inference. You can have a level of reliability based on the way it was described in the video. But that process alone is not as reliable as then adding in inference to how reliable the knowledge was in terms of it's origination and dissemination. Meaning, all the sociological inferences that 'reasonably falsify' the hypothesis that the moon landing was fake (you've then 'falsified a potential falsification of knowledge') . That inference increases reliability. So was it reliable enough before the inference? After? I'm not trying to get into that now. Just to offer that reliability might sometimes be an irreducible fabric of processes, not always just a thread. You can probably safely assume that an additional input of observation or inference can sometimes make the process more reliable, because those inputs may inform of something rightly presumed to be highly unlikely. I mean to ask: how can we possibly distill a process in all cases to binary 'reliability' or 'unreliability'? The question of context can be irrelevant to reliability. If he saw a barn as in a complete barn, in that scenario context is immaterial to reliability. So there are really 2 distinct scenarios here. I think that was expressed idk. If he only saw the face of the barn, context of course must be more heavily weighted when attempting to quantify reliability. For some reason I'm fascinated with the idea of a 'test' for 'reasonable reliability' given a set of knowledge originators/justifications etc and a specific entirety of context. Sounds pretty fuzzy so far, lol. Idk if there already is one. Maybe for very simple things. But I'd like to learn more.

  16. Henry continues driving with his son to Orlando Florida…they drive past the Pulse nightclub…Henry points out to his son that all the wounded people along the roadside have just been shot by a madman on a rampage…and they require immediate medical attention…BUT DO THEY?…one would naturally think medical attention a necessity…but Henry doesn't know that the Orlando shooting was a hoax…and what he saw along the roadside were not shooting victims…they were crisis actors…just like the fake barns Henry and his son saw in the countryside,..so Henry formed a reliable connection and believes the shooting was real…because of the media coverage that followed.

  17. I don't think Armstrong walking on the moon is a good example. The general belief relies on the government's testimony. But the government has a tendency to be unreliable. Our government, like other governments lies to the public for reasons that are not often clear Unless you can confirm the event without going through the government, there is no justification for the belief.

  18. Am I the only one who needed to pause the video when she talks about the "Fake Barn County?" These examples are so ridiculous! xD

  19. In other to mitigate this issue, one must take the perspective that all information is provisional, in this way assumptions and expectation even when made are always subject to change even when they are made without sufficient evidence (which should be discourage with such a perspective). So as Henry observed a barn instead of making assumptions or having expectations of what the barn is or the type of area they're in , all he can truly say is he observed a barn or even several and without further investigation he cannot truly deduce more information. I should also say its not so much that Henry cannot make assumptions or have expectations but he should realise they aren't concrete, so in a way they should be treated as hypothesis making them subject to change.

  20. Reliable empirical predictions… This reminds me of Plato's analogy of the cave. While one may think that the only thing that matters is the ability to predict one's experiences, this is ultimately of lesser importance than of knowing what is good and right for example.

  21. In all of these knowledge problems, all I ever see are basic appeals to skepticism. You might see a barn, but what if you're a brain in a vat plugged into the matrix? Checkmate. That's the ultimate defeater to everything, which fundamentally renders perfect knowledge impossible. So why not just bite the bullet and accept that sometimes mistakes will be made? Then learn to CORRECT those mistakes if and when they happen.

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